ConnectWise ScreenConnect CVE-2026-84869 Exploited Against MSPs

ConnectWise ScreenConnect CVE-2026-84869 Exploited Against MSPs

At a glance

SeverityCRITICAL
CVSSCVE-2026-84869: 9.9
EPSS (30-day exploit probability)CVE-2026-84869: 1.2%
In CISA KEV (exploited)Yes, due 2026-09-14
VendorConnectWise
CVE IDsCVE-2026-84869

Primary-source details

The ScreenConnect vulnerability CVE-2026-84869 in ConnectWise ScreenConnect is being exploited in the wild, and a new campaign is aimed at managed service provider (MSP) servers, SecurityWeek reports. The flaw has a CVSS score of 9.9, ConnectWise fixed it on 8 September 2026, and CISA added it to the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog on 11 September 2026 with a due date of 14 September 2026.

We are covering it now because Huntress has reported a fresh wave of attacks that has been running since at least 20 October.

What happened

According to the report, attackers are spraying MSP ScreenConnect servers and waiting for a technician to join a session. Huntress counted at least 688,000 guest “run file” requests for a file named update.bat that hit 42 MSP servers from 29 IP addresses.

When a technician joins, the guest side can push a file that the technician’s host client then runs. The technician sees no prompt. In the cases described, the batch file connects to a Telegram bot and installs a rogue ScreenConnect client.

  • One rogue client disguised as Windows Update was installed and running within nine seconds of the host client executing the batch file.
  • In another case a text file was pushed two seconds after the technician joined and executed three seconds later.
  • In October, one targeted attack on an MSP server used three real technician sessions to drop a script into the technician’s Startup folder.

Huntress says this is separate from the recent SCKit malware toolkit activity and from unauthorized sessions that posed as crypto exchanges. It also says exploitation began on 20 August, as it warned at the time of the KEV listing.

Am I affected?

NVD lists ConnectWise ScreenConnect versions before 26.6.5.9742 as affected, and that is also the fixed version NVD gives. SecurityWeek says organizations should update technician host clients to 26.6.5 or later, along with all Access agents that ConnectWise lists.

The sources conflict on what is vulnerable. The NVD description says the flaw is a condition in the ScreenConnect client and that ScreenConnect servers are not impacted. The news report describes the campaign as targeting MSP servers. The practical reading is that the exposed component is the client-side file transfer in a session that the server brokers, but check the ConnectWise advisory for the exact component list.

  • Affected: ScreenConnect before 26.6.5.9742 (NVD).
  • Fixed: 26.6.5.9742 (NVD).
  • Most exposed: MSP technician workstations that join sessions with guests or untrusted clients.

Technical details

  • Weakness: CWE-269 (improper privilege management) and CWE-862 (missing authorization).
  • CVSS 3.1 vector: AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H, base score 9.9 critical.
  • NVD describes files being transferred and executed through an active remote session without authorization or Host confirmation in certain circumstances.
  • KEV: added 11 September 2026, due date 14 September 2026. Known ransomware campaign use is listed as Unknown.

Why this matters

This section is our analysis, not new reporting. An MSP technician workstation typically holds remote management consoles, saved credentials and access to many customers, according to Huntress. One compromised technician can therefore become a route into every client environment, which makes this a supply-chain style risk.

Because the flaw is in KEV and exploitation is ongoing, treat it as a patch-within-hours item for any MSP or internal IT team that runs ScreenConnect. The KEV due date has long passed for US federal agencies.

Detection and hunting ideas

These ideas follow from the reported behaviour; they are not vendor guidance.

  • Search ScreenConnect session and file-transfer logs for guest-initiated “run file” requests, especially for update.bat.
  • Look for batch files launched by the ScreenConnect host client on technician machines, and for new files in Startup folders.
  • Inventory ScreenConnect clients and flag any you did not deploy, including ones named like Windows Update.
  • Check for outbound connections to Telegram from technician workstations, which are unusual in most managed environments.
  • Review sessions where an unknown guest joined and the technician did not start the session.

What to do

  1. Update every technician host client to 26.6.5.9742 or later, and update the Access agents ConnectWise lists.
  2. Remove any ScreenConnect client you cannot account for, then investigate the machine it was found on.
  3. Run the hunting checks above on technician workstations that joined sessions since 20 October, and on earlier activity if you have the logs.
  4. If you find a rogue client or dropped script, rotate credentials stored on that workstation and review access to customer environments.
  5. Tell downstream customers if a technician workstation was compromised.

The reporting does not name the attackers behind the campaign.

Related coverage

Sources

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